Introduction
The underlined Nouns Phrases (NPs) in (1) have been called 'Concealed Questions' (CQ, henceforth) because sentences that embed them typically have the same truth-conditional meaning as the corresponding versions with a fullfledged embedded interrogative clause, as illustrated in (2) (Heim 1979) : (1) a. John knows the price of milk. b. They announced the winner of the contest. c. The temperature of the lake depends on the season.
(2) a. John knows how much the milk costs. b. They announced who won the contest. c. How warm the lake is depends on what season it is.
The goal of this talk is to review three main approaches to CQs in the literature -the pragmatic account, the individual concept account and the propositional account-, and to evaluate them with respect to several empirical patterns. The comparison across different data sets will lead to some conclusions and some important open questions, helping characterize the state of the art of the CQ debate in the literature.
Three main approaches to CQs will be discussed. The first one is the pragmatic approach in Heim (1979) , in which [[know] ] combines with an object of type e. For example, in (1a) [[know] ] would combine with the dollar amount (or degree on a scale) provided by the NP the price of milk. The second approach is the individual concept approach (Lasersohn 2005 , Romero 2005a . In this case, [[know] ] in (1a) would combine with an object of type <s,e> provided by the NP the price of milk. Finally, in the propositional approach (Romero 2005b , Nathan 2005 , [[know] ] would combine with an object of type <s,t> (or type <s,<s,t>>) arising from the NP the price of milk in (1a).
As we evaluate these approaches, we will examine the following five empirical patterns:
(i) Simple concealed questions like the ones in (1).
(ii) Coordination of different types of verbs sharing the same NP complement.
(iii) Heim's (1979) ambiguity with nested concealed questions, illustrated in (3). Under a first reading -reading A in (4)-, (3) says that John knows the same price as Fred knows, e.g., they both know how much the milk costs. Under a second reading -reading B in (5)-, (3) asserts that John knows what price Fred knows. For example, this second reading would be true if Fred knows how much the milk costs and John knows that Fred knows how much the milk costs. Note that -assuming e.g. that the unique (relevant) price that Fred knows is the price of milk-reading A requires John to know how much the milk costs but reading B does not. (iv) Gupta's syllogism. The verbs rise, fall and change have been argued to combine with individual concepts in sentences like (6) (Montague 1974 , Dowty, Wall and Peters 1981 , Lasersohn 2005 . As we will see, Montague's analysis of (6) faces a problem with the syllogism in (7): the analysis predicts the argument to be invalid even though it is intuitively valid (Dowty, Wall and Peters 1981, citing Gupta): (6) a. The temperature of the lake is rising / falling. b. The price of milk changes every week.
B: The picture on Jordan's wall changes every month. #That's why John didn't know the picture on Jordan's wall. (Nathan 2005:59) The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the pragmatic account. Section 3 evaluates the individual concept account. Section 3 takes us to the propositional account. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and points at some important open questions. Heim's (1979) tentatively proposes a pragmatic account for simple CQs. Know has two internal arguments: an individual argument of type e, provided by the extension of the NP, and a property argument P of type <e,st>, contextually provided. Under this account, (9a) is translated as in (9b). For the property argument P, there is a strong pragmatic principle that makes P default to the property mentioned in the NP. Under the influence of this principle, the property P in (9b) would be resolved as in (9c). (9) a. John knows the capital of Italy. b. λw. know (j, ιx e [capital-of-Italy(x,w)], P, w) c. "John knows Rome as having the property P", where P is pragmatically resolved to "being the capital of Italy".
Pragmatic account
Heim makes the point that this pragmatic bias is not mandatory, that is, that P sometimes gets a value different from the property mentioned in the NP. For example, (10b) could be resolved as in (10c), as the sentence (10a) is true in scenario (11).
(10) a. John knows the most ridiculous price of the store (: the price of milk). b. λw. know (j, ιx e [most-ridiculous-price(x,w)], P, w) c. "John knows the actual most ridiculous price of the store -e.g., $1.99-as having the property P", where P is pragmatically resolved to "being the price of milk".
(11) Scenario: John knows how much the milk costs at the store, in particular, he knows that the milk costs $1.99. John knows no other price. As it turns out, the most ridiculously priced object in the store is the milk. John is not aware of the ridiculous character of this pricing.
The assumption that the NP denotes an individual of type e and that the pragmatic P can in principle be resolved to a contextually salient property faces several problems.
First, as noted in Romero (2005a) , if the value of P can sometimes arise contextually, then (12) should be able to mean "John knows Rome as being the capital of Italy" when placed in the right context. This is contrary to fact: no matter how much one plays with the context, (12) does not have a CQ reading. 1 (12) # John knows Rome.
The second problem concerns coordination. If all that the CQ NP really needs to contribute is an individual x e , then, regardless of how the value for P is achieved, we would expect that the NP can be shared in a coordination structure involving a regular extensional verb and a CQ verb. This is contrary to fact, as shown in (13 Third and finally, Heim's (1979) ambiguity for nested concealed questions cannot be derived in this approach (Romero 2005a) . To see this, consider example (3), repeated as (14), and the truth conditions (15) that this approach assigns to it.
(14) John knows the price that Fred knows.
(15) λw. know (j, ιx e [price(x,w) ∧ know(f,x e ,Q,w)], P, w)
Assuming that Fred knows how much the milk costs and that the milk costs $1.99, we can derive reading A using the values for P and Q in (16). This will give us the paraphrase "John knows as the price of milk the dollar amount x e that Fred knows as the price of milk". This is truth conditionally equivalent to reading A: "John knows the same price that Fred knows." (16) x e = $1.99 Q = "being the price of milk" ιx e [price(x,w) ∧ know(f,x,Q,w)] = $1.99 P = "being the price of milk"
For reading B, the closest that we can get to it in this approach is (17). The resulting paraphrase will be "John knows as having the property P the dollar amount x e that Fred knows as the price of milk", where P is the property "being the (dollar) value of the price that Fred knows".
1 In languages like Spanish in which epistemic 'know' and acquaintance 'know' are lexically distinct, the epistemic version of (12) ] would combine not with an individual concept, but with an object x τ pragmatically provided and with a property of objects of type τ contributed by the NP. This promising approach may be able to avoid the shortcomings of the pragmatic approach discussed in the text and inherit some of the advantages that we will discuss for the individual concept approach. 
Romero (2005a) notes that, in general, the intensional argument needed for a (de dicto attitude reading of) regular intensional verbs like look for can be drawn not just from the intension of the complement NP, but also from its extension. This is illustrated in (21)- (22). In (21), look for takes as its semantic argument the INTENSION of the NP the unicorn with the longest horn. In (22), look for takes as its semantic argument the EXTENSION of the NP, which is an intensional object itself. This yields the reading (22a), in which John is in a de dicto search in relation to the individual concept -e.g., λw".ιx e [unicorn-with-longesthorn(x,w")]-that the NP the unicorn Fred is looking for refers to in the actual world.
(21) John is looking for the unicorn with the longest horn.
a. 'In all of John's bouletic alternatives w' in w: John finds in w' the individual that is the unicorn with the longest horn in w' (whichever that may be).'
(22) John is looking for the unicorn Fred is looking for (: the one with the longest horn.) a. 'Each x out of John and Fred is such that, in all of x's bouletic alternatives w' in w: x finds in w' the individual that is the unicorn with the longest horn in w' (whichever that may be).'
The freedom to choose the intension or the extension of the complement NP -as long as the result is a intensional object of the right type-is, according to Romero (2005a) , the source of the ambiguity between reading A and reading B in nested CQ examples. Reading A of (23) 
To derive reading A, we apply the intension in the top line in (24) to a given world w in (25a) to obtain the corresponding extension, and we feed the resulting object (of type <s,e>) into the argument slot of [[know] ]. The resulting truth conditions in (25b) correspond to reading A: b. Know +CQ + extension of the NP:
To derive reading B, the NP's intension (of type <s,<s,e>>) is directly taken as the semantic argument of [[know] ] in (26). The final truth conditions in (26c) match reading B:
4 Since [[that 5 Fred knows t 5 ]] is a property of individual concepts (type <<se>,<st>>), the head noun price in the tree is assigned an intension of this type as well, so that (the intensional version of) the Predicate Modification Rule from Heim and Kratzer (1998) can apply between the two. That is, the intension of the lexical entry price in the tree (24) is a property of individual concepts (and not a property of individuals). 5 I use explicit world indexing of the entire NP (though I could have as well used free world indexing of each predicate within it). See Cresswell (1990) , Farkas (1993) and Percus (2000) for the empirical need of local and non-local world evaluation of NP predicates. For formal details, see Gallin (1975) for the formal Ty2 language and Percus (2000) for the syntax-semantics interface. 
The individual concept approach to simple CQs with know is remimiscent of the account of rise, fall and change as <s,e> taking verbs. For example, in (28a) (=(6a)), the NP the temperature of the lake contributes the individual concept in (27), which then combines with the intensional verb rise in (28b). This is completely parallel to the CQ example in (19)- (20).
(27) Semantic contribution of the NP the temperature of the lake:
λw". ιx e [temp-of-lake(x,w")]
(28) a. The temperature of the lake is rising. b. λw. rise ( λw'.ιx e [temp-of-lake(x,w')], w )
If the individual concept approach is to succeed with know, it should also address the challenges posed by rise, fall and change. There is a long standing puzzle, attributed to Anil Gupta in Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981) , for the individual concept approach to verbs like rise. The puzzle is the following. The syllogism in (29) with P 2 (i 1 ) = 91 with P 3 (i 1 ) = 83 P 1 (i 2 ) = 98 P 2 (i 2 ) = 90 P 3 (i 2 ) = 82 P 1 (i 3 ) = 97 P 2 (i 3 ) = 89 P 3 (i 3 ) = 81
Hence, the formulas in (30) do not correctly translate the valid argument (29). 7 The question is, what should be changed in the formal translations to secure the validity of the argument. Lasersohn (2005) argues that the Montague-style translations in (30) are problematic because they presume that the English nouns temperature and price express properties of individual concepts rather than simple properties of individuals, thus allowing for models like (31). Under the Russellian treatment of 7 Gupta's syllogism for individual concepts with rise can be reproduced for CQs with know.
Consider reading A of (i.ii) and (i.iii) below. Under reading A, (i.ii) says that the unique price x <s,e> first announced on the radio is such that Martin knows x <s,e> (regardless of whether he knows when and where it was announced). Similarly, reading A of (i.iii) says that the unique price z <s,e> first announced on TV is such that Martin knows z <s,e> . Under these readings, the argument in (i) is valid. Then, translating the syllogism in a way parallel to (30) leads to the same puzzle as before. (i) i. Necessarily, the price announced first on the radio is the price announced first on TV.
ii. Martin knows the price first announced on the radio. iii. Martin knows the price first announced on TV. Although the Fregean treatment of definite descriptions solves the puzzle for the particular syllogism in (29), this solution is not general enough. The puzzle re-arises in parallel syllogisms where this solution cannot be applied. To see this, consider the variant of Gupta's syllogism in (33), also valid:
(33) i. Necessarily, every price that John knows is a/one price that Fred knows ii. One of the prices that John knows is rising. iii. One of the prices that Fred knows is rising.
Here the NPs at issue are not definite descriptions, and the N-bars price that John knows and price that Fred knows need to express precisely <s,<<s,e>,t>>-functions, i.e. properties of individual concepts. This means that Lasersohn's solution cannot be used here. The quantified NPs will translate as quantification over the variables x and z of type <s,e> in (34), which will serve as arguments both in the formula rise (x,w) and in the formula price- NP-knows(x,w) . This means that the corresponding English nouns (or N') express properties of individual concepts and that models like (35) What changes could be made to the Montague-style translations in (34) to make them form a valid argument? Note that, besides the differences in the translation of definite descriptions and in the functions expressed by the nouns, the Montague-style translation (30i) and Lasersohn's translation (32i) differed in another respect. In the first case, we extract the unique x <s,e> / z <s,e> from the NP's extension at w', and we apply it to the world w' before obtaining the equation x(w')=z(w'). This is sketched in (36). This leads to the original Montague-style translation (30i), repeated below as (37). (36) To solve the variant of Gupta's syllogism in (33), I propose to follow the latter strategy: We quantify over an x <s,e> / z <s,e> extracted from the NP's extension, and we produce the equation x=z directly, without applying x <s,e> / z <s,e> to any world w'. This means that, in (33i), crosscategorial be equates two individual concepts x <s,e> and z <s,e> , not two individuals x <s,e> (w') and z <s,e> (w'). The proposed translations for the variant of Gupta's syllogism are in (40). When evaluated at a world w 1 that is accessible to itself, (40) forms a valid argument, as the reader can check for herself.
ii. λw. ∃x <s,e> [ price-J-knows(x,w) ∧ rise(x,w) ] iii. λw. ∃z <s,e> [ price-F-knows(z,w) ∧ rise(z,w) ]
Propositional account
As we have seen, the individual concept account assumes a parallel treatment of individual concepts (ICs) with rise / fall / change and CQs with know. However, there are empirical differences suggesting that, at some point, the two types of NPs need to be distinguished. The question is how and from what point on in the derivation the two types differ. The first difference concerns coordination. Nathan (2005:55) notes that two verbs like rise and fall can be coordinated and share their NP argument in (41a). Similarly, two CQ-taking verbs can be coordinated and share the CQ argument, as in (41b). However, coordination between rise/fall and know sharing the NP argument leads to ungrammaticality, witness (41c). 9 This pattern suggest that the IC argument of rise is, as a whole, different from the CQ argument of know. Building on Romero (2005a) , Romero (2005b) develops a propositional account of CQ. Her aim is to account for the differences -including coordination structures and non-maximal readings-between NP arguments of extensional and intensional verbs (e.g. look for) on the one hand and CQs on the other. As it turns out, Romero's (2005b) propositional analysis of CQs can be also used to characterize the external difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with know. Internally, the compositional derivation of IC NPs and CQ NPs is the same. For example, when composing the pieces of the NP the price of milk, in both cases we obtain the individual concept in (42). In the case of rise / fall / change, the meaning of the verb combines directly with this individual concept, as shown in (43). In the case of know, the individual concept combines first with the answer operator ANS in (44a). The result is the propositional concept -type <s,<s,t>>-in (44b). It is this propositional concept, and not the original individual concept, that constitutes the semantic argument of know, as shown in (44c,d) . (42) The second difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with know concerns the internal structure of the NP, more concretely, the nature of the head noun (Löbner 1981 , Janssen 1984 , Nathan 2005 . Relational nouns (price, temperature, governor, etc.) and non-relational nouns (picture on Jordan's wall, semanticist, etc.) form acceptable ICs with rise / fall / change. The situation is different for CQs. Relational nouns form in general acceptable CQs (though there are numerous exceptions), whereas non-relational nouns are unacceptable CQs. The contrast between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with respect to nonrelational verbs is illustrated by Nathan's (2005) examples ( Nathan's (2005) solution to this internal difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs is the following. Nathan assumes that NPs with rise / fall / change are individual concepts whereas CQs are propositional in nature, roughly as above. However, he proposes that this difference is not determined externally, but internally at the level of the head noun. This is achieved by assuming lexical entries of basic type <s,<e,<et>>> for relational nouns and of basic type <s,et> for non-relational nouns, and constraining shifting operations as in (47)- (48). The basic intensions of relational and non-relational nouns can be shifted to sets of individual concepts using the shifters in (47). Thus, both types of nouns will be able to head NP arguments of rise / fall / change: 
In contrast, the basic intensions of relational nouns, but not the basic intensions of non-relational nouns, can be shifted into sets of propositions. The shifter in (48a) performs the former shift, but no shifter is available to transform the <s,et> function of a non-relational noun into a set of propositions. As [[know] ] is assumed to combine with a set of propositions, a relational head noun will, but a non-relational head noun will not, constitute an NP complement of the adequate semantic type.
(48) Shifting from basic intensions to sets of propositions: a. <s,<e,et>> → <(e),<st,t>>: λP <s,<e,et>> λy e λp <st> .∃x e [p= λw 1 .P(w 1 )(y)(x)] b. <s,et> → <st,t> I do not presently have an alternative account of this intriguing difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with respect to their head noun. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that making the propositional nature of CQs stem from the internal semantics of the NP -as in Nathan's propositional account-instead of deriving it externally to the NP -as in Romero (2005b) -faces some challenges.
The first challenge concerns the aforementioned ambiguity between reading A and reading B. This ambiguity arises not only with CQs with know, as we saw in (3), but also with ICs with change, as in (49): (49) The price that had to change changed. a. Reading A: "There is a price x <s,e> -e.g. the price of milk-that had to change and that has changed." b. Reading B: "There used to be a price x <s,e> -e.g. the price of milk-that had to change, but now the price that has to change is another one -e.g. the price of ham."
In Romero's (2005b) propositional account, the ambiguity between reading A and reading B stems from the choice between the extension and the intension of the original NP, regardless of whether the main verb is rise / fall / change or know. If the semantic contribution of the NP directly combines with the verbs rise / fall / change, then we have exactly the analysis that we saw in section 3, applied now to (49) In Nathan's (2005) propositional account, the ambiguity between reading A and B is not given a unified analysis but must be derived using different means in each case. For ambiguous ICs with rise / fall / change, the strategy in (50)- (51) is adopted. But, for ambiguous CQs with know, we cannot apply the same strategy because we already have (a set of) propositions at the level of the head noun. Instead, the special shifter in (54) [ ιp [C(p) ∧ ∃y e [ p = λw'.∃x e ∀w"∈Dox f (w') [y costs x at w"]] ] (w) = 1] "John knows the unique true proposition p in the set {'There is some x such that Fred knows that the milk costs x', 'There is some x such that Fred knows that the ham costs x', 'There is some x such that Fred knows that the oil costs x', …}."
A second challenge for an account deriving the propositional nature of CQs internally to the NP arises with nesting of know and rise / fall / change. Consider example (56), in which a CQ with know is nested within ICs with rise:
(56) The price / One of the prices that John knows is rising. In Nathan's account, since the verb in the Relative Clause is know and the argument of know is intrinsically of propositional type, the Relative Clause as a whole must express a property of CQs, that is, a property of propositions. But the entire NP must pick an IC, since it has to combine with rise. Once we have propositions, it is not clear how to turn them back into ICs to derive (56) and the variant of Gupta's syllogism (33).
In Romero's account, the problem can be circumvented if we allow for the relative pronoun to abstract not over the complex [ANS+IC] , but just over a trace t 5,<se> embedded under ANS, as in (57) . This means that the Relative Clause will express a property of individual concepts and not of propositions (or of propositional concepts). Thus, the compositional semantics of the NP will remain -except for the part in (58)-as in (24), the extension of the entire NP will be the individual concept ιx <s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w"∈Dox f (w) [x(w") = x(w)]], and [[rise] ] will take this individual concept as its argument.
